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Prediction Error Associated with the Perceptual
Segmentation of Naturalistic Events
Jeffrey M. Zacks1, Christopher A. Kurby1,2, Michelle L. Eisenberg1,
and Nayiri Haroutunian1

Abstract
■ Predicting the near future is important for survival and plays
a central role in theories of perception, language processing,
and learning. Prediction failures may be particularly important
for initiating the updating of perceptual and memory systems
and, thus, for the subjective experience of events. Here, we
asked observers to make predictions about what would happen
5 sec later in a movie of an everyday activity. Those points

INTRODUCTION
Humans and other species depend heavily on predictions
about the near future to guide behavior. Predictions that
allow one to anticipate features such as the movements
of objects and the behaviors of other animals are of great
adaptive benefit: They allow an organism to anticipate
threats and opportunities and to respond appropriately before it is too late. In perception, predictions about forthcoming visual content guide eye movements, attention,
and the neural processing of objectsʼ identity and location
(Bar, 2009; Enns & Lleras, 2008; Summerfield et al., 2006).
In language comprehension, predictions about likely words
guide word recognition and syntactic parsing (Elman, 2009;
Pickering & Garrod, 2007). When learning to perform a task,
predictions about the reward value of potential actions are
used to improve performance (Maia, 2009).
Errors in prediction are a valuable source of information
about whether an organismʼs representation of the environment is effective. Research on reinforcement learning
has shown that by monitoring errors in prediction while
behaving, an organism can form an accurate model of
the environment that supports adaptive behavior (Maia,
2009; Niv & Schoenbaum, 2008). When representations
fit events in the world well, prediction error should be
low; when they fit poorly, prediction error should rise.
One intriguing possibility is that transient increases in prediction error could be used to regulate attentional control
over time. According to one recent model (Zacks, Speer,
Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007), working memory representations of the current event guide perceptual predic1
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where prediction was more difficult corresponded with subjective boundaries in the stream of experience. At points of unpredictability, midbrain and striatal regions associated with the
phasic release of the neurotransmitter dopamine transiently increased in activity. This activity could provide a global updating
signal, cuing other brain systems that a significant new event has
begun. ■

tions about the immediate future. These predictions are
checked against what happens next in the perceptual
stream; most of the time, perceptual predictions about
what happens next are accurate. From time to time, however, activity becomes less predictable, causing a spike in
prediction errors. These spikes in prediction error are fed
back to update working memory and reorient the organism
to salient new features in the environment. According to this
model, the increase in prediction error and consequent updating results in the subjective experience of an event
boundary in perceptual experience. Computational simulations support the viability of this mechanism: Recurrent
neural networks were trained to perform one-step prediction tasks in an environment consisting of recurring events.
Increases in prediction error were reliable predictors that
a new event had begun and could be used to adaptively update memory representations, thus improving prediction
performance (Reynolds, Zacks, & Braver, 2007).
The segmentation of ongoing activity into discrete events
is a highly salient feature of subjective experience—and one
that is tightly related to memory and cognition. In the laboratory, human subjects can easily mark off the time point
at which they perceive one event to end and another to
begin, and such judgments are reliable across and within
observers (Speer, Swallow, & Zacks, 2003; Newtson,
1976). Event boundaries during perception predict what
will be remembered later (Zacks, Speer, Vettel, & Jacoby,
2006; Newtson, 1976) and are associated with transient
brain responses in the parietal, temporal, and frontal lobes
(Zacks et al., 2001). Importantly, the brain responses are
observed independently of whether observers are deliberately attending to segmentation, suggesting that these mechanisms are a normal concomitant of ongoing perception.
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One candidate system for signaling prediction error during ongoing perception is the midbrain phasic dopamine
system (MDS), which includes dopamine cells in the substantia nigra (SN) and ventral tegmental area ( VTA)
(Schultz, 1998). The MDS projects broadly and directly to
the cortex and indirectly through the striatum. Cells in the
MDS show strong responses to at least three distinct sorts
of unpredictability: unexpected reward, uncertainty about
outcomes, and salience (Schultz, 1998, 2007; Horvitz,
2000). Responses to unexpected rewards can be used to
adjust behavior to maximize reward (Maia, 2009). Uncertainty responses may potentiate the dopamine pathway,
fine-tuning the prediction error signal (Schultz, 2007). Salience responses may serve as a cue to the organism to
orient to new potential rewards (Kakade & Dayan, 2002)
or to learn features of its environment that are not currently connected to reward but that could become important for reward later (Horvitz, 2000).
Human fMRI studies provide evidence of a role for the
MDS in signaling all three kinds of uncertainty. In classical
conditioning paradigms, the MDS and its striatal targets
have been found to track deviations from expected reward
(DʼArdenne, McClure, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; McClure,
Berns, & Montague, 2003). In studies of classification learning tasks without an explicit reward, the MDS has been
found to increase in activity when outcomes are unpredictable and when unexpected outcomes occur (Aron et al.,
2004; Volz, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2003). In target detection tasks, MDS responses to salient distractor stimuli
have been observed, even when the distractors do not require any response (Zink, Pagnoni, Chappelow, MartinSkurski, & Berns, 2006; Zink, Pagnoni, Martin, Dhamala,
& Berns, 2003).
Currently, there is a debate about whether the MDS
codes prediction error about reward per se or signals multiple types of prediction error and whether multiple mechanisms involving the MDS and striatum likely are involved
in signaling prediction error (Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, &
OʼDoherty, 2010; Schultz, 2010; Horvitz, 2000; Schultz &

Dickinson, 2000). However, the various accounts are consistent with the possibility that transient increases in
prediction error are signaled by the MDS to the cortex,
leading to memory updating and the subjective experience
that a new event has begun.
The hypothesis that subjective event boundaries correspond to transient unpredictability leads to several specific
proposals: First, if observers are explicitly asked to make
predictions about the near future, this should be more difficult when predicting across a subjective event boundary.
Second, attempting to make predictions across event
boundaries should activate the MDS. Third, the MDS
should also be more active when information from a newly
begun event provides a signal that oneʼs predictions are incorrect. To test these proposals, we presented human observers with movies of naturalistic activities, measured their
ability to predict what would happen in the movie in the
near future, and measured activity with fMRI.

METHODS
Human observers watched movies depicting everyday
events (washing a car, building a LEGO model, putting
up a tent, washing clothes, and planting a window box).
Three experiments probed behavioral performance, and
one measured brain activity with fMRI. In all experiments,
the movies were stopped approximately once per minute,
and the participants were asked to make a prediction about
what would be on the screen in 5 sec. The stopping points
were chosen so as to occur 2.5 sec before a natural event
boundary or 2.5 sec before a natural event middle based
on judgments of a previous group of observers (Figure 1).
After each prediction was made, the movie restarted from
the pause point. This provided feedback about the participantsʼ prediction by revealing the correct frame 5 sec after
the movie restarted (Figure 2A). This paradigm was inspired
by studies of probabilistic classification learning (Aron et al.,
2004) and adapted for prediction during continuous activity.

Figure 1. Illustration of the
selection of within-event and
across-event trials. The black
curve plots the probability
density of segmentation for the
LEGO movie. The red arrows
indicate the across-event
condition test points, and the
blue arrows indicate the withinevent condition test points.
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Figure 2. Predicting the near future is more difficult at event boundaries. (A) Participants viewed movies of everyday events (247- to 432-sec
duration). Eight times during each movie, the movie was paused and the viewer was asked to predict what would be on the screen in 5 sec.
Experiments 1 and 3 used a two-alternative forced-choice procedure, in which participants chose between the correct picture and a similar appearing
picture taken from a different movie. (In this example, the picture on the left is correct.) Experiment 2 used a yes–no procedure, in which one of
the two possible pictures was presented and participants were required to assess whether it was correct. In Experiment 3, participants made an
assessment of their prediction confidence using a 6-point Likert-type scale before the two test pictures were presented. (B) By all measures,
prediction performance was worse for across-event trials than within-event trials. Statistical tests were conducted using both participants and items as
the random effect. In Experiments 1, 3, and 4, forced-choice accuracy was lower (top graph) and responses were slower (second graph) when
predicting across events. [By participants: smallest t(23) = 6.68, p < .001; by items: smallest t(38) = 2.84, p = .007. For response time, by
participants: smallest t(23) = 3.28, p = .003; by items: smallest t(38) = 2.42, p = .007.)] Experiment 2 was analyzed using signal detection analysis
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), which showed that discrimination between correct and incorrect pictures was lower across than within events
(third graph; by participants: t(23) = 4.82, p < .001; by items: t(38) = 3.56, p = .001). Moreover, participantsʼ decision criteria were more
conservative across than within events, indicating that, overall, pictures taken from new events were judged less likely to be correct, although
this effect was significant only by participants (fourth graph; by participants: t23 = 2.71, p = .013; by items: t(38) = 0.98, p = .335, ns). In
Experiment 3, confidence judgments made before presentation of the test pictures indicated that participants were less confident in their ability
to predict as they approached a new event (bottom graph; by participants: t(23) = 6.81, p < .001; by items: t(38) = 2.42, p = .021. (Error bars depict
standard errors.)
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Participants
Participants were drawn from the Washington University
community. Participants in Experiments 1–3 received $10
or partial credit for a course requirement. Participants in
Experiment 4 received $25/hr. Experiment 1 had 52 participants (31 women, ages = 18–54 years), Experiment 2
had 24 participants (14 women, ages = 18–25 years),
Experiment 3 had 24 participants (14 women, ages =
18–22 years), and Experiment 4 had 25 participants
(12 women, ages = 19–34 years).

Materials and Stimulus Presentation
Movies of everyday activities were selected from a previous study of event perception in younger and older
adults (Kurby & Zacks, 2011). The five activities used
were washing a car (432 sec), building a LEGO model
(247 sec), putting up a tent (378 sec), washing clothes
(300 sec), and planting a window box (354 sec). Each
was filmed with a digital camera from a fixed head-height
perspective, with no edits, zooms, or camera motion. In the
previous study, neurologically healthy older (60–89 years)
and younger (18–23 years) adults segmented the movies
into meaningful events. They were instructed to segment
while viewing by pressing a button whenever, in their judgment, one meaningful unit of activity ended and another
began. For the data used in the present analyses, participants were asked to identify the largest units they found
meaningful. We used these data to identify normative event
boundaries. First, we estimated the probability density of
segmentation throughout each movie using gaussian kernel density estimation (3-sec bandwidth). We then defined
a 5-sec window around each local maximum and minimum
and computed the proportion of participants that segmented the movie within this window. On the basis of
these segmentation proportions, we selected the top four
maxima as across-event condition test points and the bottom four minima locations as the within-event condition
test points (see Figure 1). In some cases, top candidate
maxima occurred at the end of the movie, likely because
of the salient change in activity caused by the actor leaving
the scene. We excluded these locations as candidate test
points. This selection procedure resulted in a total of 20
across-event test points (mean segmentation proportion =
.59, SD = .11) and 20 within-event test points (mean segmentation proportion = .01, SD = .01). The average temporal distance between test points was 39.34 sec (SD =
27.10 sec, min = 7.14 sec, max = 125.19 sec).
In Experiments 1–3, stimuli were presented on an
LCD monitor by a Macintosh computer (Apple, Cupertino,
CA) with PsyScope X software (psy.ck.sissa.it). In Experiment 4, stimuli were rear-projected onto a screen
placed at the foot of the scanner bore and were viewed
through a mirror attached to the scanner head coil. In
all experiments, participants responded using a button
box.
4060
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The task structure for Experiment 1 was as follows: Participants watched each movie from beginning to end, with
interruptions for prediction trials (eight per movie). For
each prediction trial, the movie was paused 2.5 sec before
the local maximum (for across-event trials) or minimum
(for within-event trials) in segmentation probability. The
screen was cleared, and two test images appeared side
by side. One image was the frame 5 sec subsequent to
the pausing of the movie, and the other was a foil selected
from a similar movie filmed with the same actor performing a related activity in the same setting (see Figure 2);
foils were taken from the same proportional time in the
alternate activity. Participants selected which of the two
images they believed was about to appear in the movie.
Participants were trained to make their responses within
5 sec; failure to respond in this window resulted in presentation of a timeout message. After responding, participants
were given immediate feedback in the form of a text display (“RIGHT” or “WRONG”). The movie then was restarted from the pause point. The movieʼs resumption
provided further feedback regarding the participantsʼ predictions, as they then saw the frame that actually did appear. Before beginning the main task, they practiced
using a movie of a woman making a sandwich (147 sec,
with six prediction trials).
The task structure for Experiment 2 was identical to
that of Experiment 1, except that, rather than two pictures, only one was presented, and the participants were
asked to judge whether that picture would appear shortly.
On half of the trials, the correct response was “yes.” (Assignment of trials to “yes” or “no” was randomized once;
half of the participants received the randomized list and
the other half received a list with the trial assignments reversed.) Again, immediate feedback was given, this time
indicating whether the response was a correct positive, a
missed positive, a correct negative, or a missed negative.
For Experiment 3, the task structure was identical to
Experiment 1 with two exceptions. First, before the two
alternatives were shown, participants reported their subjective confidence in their ability to predict the upcoming
activity. A 6-point Likert-type scale was presented, with
the ends marked 1 (not at all ) and 6 (extremely well ).
The top of the screen presented a reminder of the instructions that read, “How well do you think you can predict
what will happen in a few seconds?” Participants indicated
their confidence by pressing one of six marked buttons on
a button box. Then, after giving a confidence judgment,
the two pictures were presented and participants made
their prediction as in Experiment 1. Second, participants
did not receive explicit feedback about their predictions.
This was done to reduce the chance that feedback would
influence later confidence judgments.
For Experiment 4, the task structure was identical to
Experiment 1 with three exceptions. First, no explicit
feedback was given after each picture was selected; feedback was provided solely by the resumption of the movie.
Second, to allow for separation of the brain response to
Volume 23, Number 12

the prediction trials from the response to movie resumptions, we introduced a jitter (2–10 sec) between the offset
of the two picture alternatives and the restarting of the
movie. Third, the two picture alternatives remained onscreen for the full 5-sec response window rather than
offsetting when the participant responded.

MRI Scanning and Data Analysis
For Experiment 4, MRI scanning was conducted on a 3 T
Vision scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). Functional
images were collected with an echoplanar pulse sequence at a rate of one frame every 2.048 sec (slice repetition time [TR] = 64 msec, echo time [TE] = 25). To
provide optimal contrast for distinguishing the SN and
VTA, we acquired a proton density-weighted turbo spin
echo sequence. The sequence used a double-echo procedure to also acquire a T2-weighted image (slice TR =
8.04 sec, TE = 18/105 msec). The T2-weighted image
was used together with a high-resolution T1-weighted

anatomical scan for atlas normalization and visualization
(slice TR = 2.1 sec, TE = 3.93 msec).
Before analysis, the functional data were processed to
correct slice-to-slice timing offsets, normalize slice-to-slice
intensity differences, correct for within-run and betweenrun motion, and normalize the whole-brain image intensity to a mode of 1000. The functional data were aligned to
the T2 image, and these were aligned to the individualʼs
high-resolution structural images. The functional and
structural data were resampled to a standard stereotaxic
space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) using 3.0-mm isotropic voxels with an atlas representative target constructed using the methodology described by Buckner
and colleagues (2004) and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (6 mm FWHM).
For each participant, the left and right SN were traced
by hand on the high-resolution T1-weighted image using
the proton density-weighted image as a reference (see
Figure 3A). The right and left SN are hyperintense areas
in the proton density image medial to the hypointense
cerebral peduncles and lateral to the hypointense red

Figure 3. The MDS and its striatal targets are activated when attempting to predict features of a new event. (A) For each participant, the SN and
VTAs were identified by manual tracing using Caret (Van Essen et al., 2001), and the caudate nucleus and putamen were identified using FreeSurfer
( Jovicich et al., 2009; see Supplementary Methods). (B) Magnitude of evoked fMRI response when attempting to predict. Significant responses during
the prediction task were observed in the left SN, caudate, and putamen. For the right SN, activity was significantly greater for prediction across than
within events (red bracket); for the right caudate, this trend approached statistical significance (gray bracket). (Error bars depict standard errors.)
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nuclei and hyperintense interpeduncular fossa. The SN
extends along the length of the cerebral peduncles.
The VTA is the hyperintense area bounded laterally by
the SN and red nuclei and bordering the interpeduncular
fossa (DʼArdenne et al., 2008; Haber & Gdowski, 2004;
Steward, 2000). The right and left SN and the VTA were
traced in each slice of the brain using the volume segmentation edit voxels function of Caret. The areas were
traced in an axial view and then adjusted using coronal
and sagittal views. The caudate nucleus and putamen
were identified from the T1-weighted anatomic image
using the automated method implemented in FreeSurfer
( Jovicich et al., 2009).
fMRI data analyses were based on the general linear
model (GLM), and all analyses were performed with FIDL
(www.nil.wustl.edu/∼fidl/). We simultaneously modeled
the brain response to the prediction task and to the subsequent restarting of the movie. For each participant we constructed a GLM with effects coding for the within-event and
across-event prediction trials and for the within-event and
across-event restarting of the movies. Activation during the
prediction task was modeled using an assumed hemodynamic response function (Boynton, Engel, Glover, &
Heeger, 1996). Predictor variables for the within-event
and across-event conditions were constructed by creating
a train of impulses time-locked to the trials with durations
equal to the participantʼs response time and then convolving each train of impulses with the model hemodynamic
response function. This approach assumes that the interval
of relevant brain activity corresponds to the period from
the onset of the trial until the participantʼs response, and
it controls for differences in response time that may contribute to differences in the estimated brain response. Activation during the subsequent restarting of the movie was
modeled using a finite impulse response basis set to estimate the time course of brain activity (Ollinger, Corbetta, &
Shulman, 2001). This approach was taken because it was
not reasonable to specify a priori the time course of brain
activity during the movie restarting and consequent confirmation or disconfirmation of predictions. Time courses of
10 frames were estimated beginning with the onset of the
movie. The GLMs also included variables coding for effects
of no interest, specifically scan-to-scan differences in baseline and linear trends within each scan. Error trials were
excluded from the analysis because they were not frequent
enough to model reliably.
For the region-wise analyses, GLMs were fit to the BOLD
time course for each participant for each ROI. Analyses
with participant as the random effect were carried out
using t tests for the magnitude of response during the prediction trials and ANOVAs for the time course of response
during the subsequent movie resumption.
For the whole-brain analyses, the GLM fitting and random effects analyses used the same form, except that the
unit of analysis was the voxel rather than the region. To
correct for multiple comparisons across voxels, t statistics
were converted to z statistics and thresholded to include
4062
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only clusters of two or more voxels with a z of greater
than 4.5. ANOVA F statistics were converted to z statistics
and thresholded to include only clusters of five or more
voxels with a z of greater than 4.5. These thresholds have
been shown in simulation studies to control the overall probability of a false positive response at p = .05
(McAvoy, Ollinger, & Buckner, 2001).

RESULTS
Prediction Performance
All four experiments revealed that prediction was more
difficult when predictions crossed an event boundary.
In Experiment 1, participants made their judgments by
selecting from two pictures, one of which was the actual
frame from 5 sec later in the movie; the other picture was
a foil taken from a similar movie involving the same actor
and setting. Predictions were slower and less accurate when
they crossed an event boundary (Figure 2B, top two
graphs). In Experiment 2, participants made a prediction
about whether a single picture was the frame they would
see 5 sec later; half of the time, the picture was the one
they would see, and half of the time, it was a foil. We used
rates of correct identification and false alarms to estimate
measures of prediction ability (Discrimination, d0) and bias
to respond “no” (Criterion, C) using signal detection theory
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). Prediction ability was lower
when predicting across events (Figure 2B, third graph).
Furthermore, participants showed a stronger bias to respond “no,” indicating that when predicting across an event
boundary, any picture seems less likely to actually occur
(Figure 2B, fourth graph). In Experiment 3, the twoalternative procedure of Experiment 1 was used but participants were also required to estimate their confidence in
their predictions before each pair of test alternatives was
presented. Participants reported lower confidence when
trying to predict across events (Figure 2B, fifth graph). (Experiment 3 also replicated the accuracy and response time
effects of Experiment 1; see Figure 2B, top two graphs.)

Midbrain Dopaminergic System Activation
To test the proposal that the MDS is engaged during an
attempt to predict across an event boundary, we measured brain responses time-locked to the presentation
of the two test pictures depicting possibilities for what
might happen in 5 sec (see Figure 2A). The results are
summarized in Figure 3B. Across-event responses were
significantly greater than within-event responses in the
right SN (t24 = 2.2, p = .04); this difference approached
significance in the right caudate (t24 = 2.0, p = .05). For
across-event trials, significant responses were observed in
the left and right SN, left and right caudate, and the left
putamen (smallest t24 = 2.2, p = .04). For within-event
trials, significant responses were observed in the left

Volume 23, Number 12

condition, even in the cases when they were uncertain
or guessing but answered correctly. Therefore, we compared activity when the movie restarted in the acrossevent condition to that in the within-event condition.
Significant differences between across-event and withinevent trials in the time course of activity during the 18.4 sec
following the movie onset were observed in two regions
(Figure 4): the left caudate (F9, 216 = 3.02, p = .002) and
the left putamen (F9, 216 = 2.73, p = .005). This difference
approached significance in the right SN (F9, 216 = 1.87, p =
.06). In all three areas, activity increased during acrossevent trials relative to within-event trials.
Whole-brain Analyses

Figure 4. Disconfirming information from the beginning of a new
event was accompanied by increased fMRI response in the MDS and its
striatal targets. Each panel plots the difference in the fMRI response to
restarting the movie in an across-event trial compared with a withinevent trial. The new eventʼs beginning was 2.5 sec after the movie
onset. Between 8 and 10 sec after the movie onset, a maximal
difference response is observed. (Gray regions depict standard errors.)

SN, caudate, and putamen and in the right putamen
(smallest t24 = 2.1, p = .05).
To test the proposal that the MDS is engaged when
information from a newly begun event provides a signal
that oneʼs predictions are incorrect, we measured brain
responses time-locked to the restarting of the movie after
each prediction trial. Overt errors were rare (Figure 2B,
top graph), precluding a comparison between error and
correct trials. However, because overt errors were more
likely in the across-event condition, it is also likely that
participants experienced disconfirming evidence in this

To investigate the responses of small brain regions, particularly the MDS ROIs, region-specific analyses are necessary. To explore the correlates of these effects across the
brain, we also conducted whole-brain analyses (see MRI
Scanning and Data Analysis). Responses time-locked to
the presentation of the pictures were greater during
across-event trials than during within-event trials in several brain regions: the juncture of the parietal, temporal,
and occipital lobes bilaterally and in a small region in the
right anterior temporal cortex (Figure 5). No regions
showed the opposite pattern. During the intervals after
restarting the movie, these regions also showed differences between within- and across-event trials, as did
others bilaterally in the posterior occipital, temporal,
and parietal cortex, the premotor cortex, and the left insular cortex. Similar to the responses observed in the left
caudate, left putamen, and right SN, these responses were
greater for across-event trials, consistent with a stronger
response to disconfirming information (Figure 6). The regions identified in these analyses correspond well with
those identified in previous studies of event boundaries in
film (Zacks et al., 2001) and text comprehension (Whitney
et al., 2009; Speer, Reynolds, & Zacks, 2007). They also
include much of the dorsal and ventral attentional systems associated with attentional reorienting (Corbetta,
Patel, & Shulman, 2008). The STS, which showed the strongest effects, is also strongly activated at event boundaries
and has been proposed to be involved in predicting the
endpoints of complex biological motion trajectories
(Frith, 2007).
Could the effect observed here of event boundaries
on behavioral performance and neural activity during
the prediction task arise simply because of differences
in low-level image similarity or differences in the likelihood that the actor was performing the same nameable
action? Supplementary analyses indicated that neither
the behavioral effects nor the fMRI responses in the
MDS and striatum for the prediction task could be accounted for by image similarity or matches in the action
being performed (see Supplementary Material). However,
when the movie was subsequently restarted, the fMRI response in the MDS and striatal ROIs were significantly
Zacks et al.
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Figure 5. A whole-brain
analysis found regions of
parietotemporal cortex that
were activated when attempting
to predict features of a new
event. Regions of significant
activation are shown, projected
on left and right lateral views of
the cortical hemispheres using
Caret (Van Essen et al., 2001).

related to image similarity, and controlling for this relationship rendered the event boundary effects nonsignificant. (There were no significant effects of action matches
or image similarity in the whole-brain analysis.) Thus,
larger responses in the MDS and striatum during this
phase may be accounted for by larger visual stimulus
changes rather than disconfirming information per se.
Because in naturalistic experience prediction errors are
likely to be larger when stimulus changes are larger,
either mechanism would lead to an adaptive signal for
learning and memory updating.

DISCUSSION
In four experiments, human observers attempted to predict the appearance of a visual scene 5 sec in the future of
an unfolding naturalistic activity. When the 5-sec interval
included an event boundary, predictions were less accurate and were made less confidently. These behavioral
markers of unpredictability were accompanied by transient
increases in the fMRI response during the attempt to predict in parts of the MDS and in the striatum, which is one of
the main projection targets of the MDS. The increases were

Figure 6. Disconfirming
information from the
beginning of a new event was
accompanied by increased
fMRI response throughout
the cortex. (A) Areas with a
significant difference in the time
course of response after the
onset of the movie in the
within- and across-event
conditions, projected on the
medial and lateral cortical
hemispheres using Caret
(Van Essen et al., 2001). The
two regions that showed the
strongest effect are highlighted
and plotted in B and C. B and C
plot the difference in the fMRI
response to restarting the
movie in an across-event trial
compared with a within-event
trial in each region. The new
eventʼs beginning was 2.5 sec
after the movie onset. Between
8 and 10 sec after the movie
onset, a maximal difference
response is observed, similar to
that observed in the midbrain
and striatum (see Figure 4).
(Gray regions depict standard
errors.)

4064

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

Volume 23, Number 12

not accounted for by the degree of visual change in the
stimulus or by the occurrence of a change in the action performed by the actor. Thus, they are most consistent with
the accumulation of an uncertainty signal mediated by
the MDS.
After each prediction attempt the movie resumed, providing the participants with direct feedback regarding the
accuracy of their predictions. During this interval, the fMRI
signal in other parts of the MDS and striatum increased
more for trials that included an event boundary. This response may reflect the prediction error signal associated
with receiving disconfirmation (Aron et al., 2004), although
it also could reflect greater change in the stimulus.
These results show that the subjective structure of
events corresponds with breakdowns in predictability.
They are consistent with the proposal that the subjective
experience of an event boundary results from transient increases in prediction error (Zacks et al., 2007). However,
it is possible that the brain responses observed here reflect some co-occurring attribute of event boundaries
other than increased prediction error. We investigated
two reasonable candidates: changes in action and changes
in image similarity. These control analyses did not provide
any evidence that action changes or image similarity were
related to effects during the prediction task, which increases our confidence that this response reflects prediction per se. However, it is possible that it could be
because of some other uncontrolled feature of the naturalistic stimuli.
The pattern of brain responses observed here converges partially with results from a recent study by Schiffer
and Schubotz (2011) that directly manipulated predictability as observers watched sequences of human dance
movements after learning to perform similar sequences.
In that study, when movement sequences violated viewersʼ expectations, there were increases in several regions
similar to those observed in the current study: the caudate nucleus, the posterior STS and adjacent parietal cortex, medial parietal cortex, and the middle frontal gyrus
(see Figures 5 and 6). However, there were also several
differences between the responses observed by Schiffer
and Schubotz and those seen here. Compared with the
present study, they observed responses that were more
weighted toward the middle frontal gyrus and the medial
pFC and less weighted toward the occipital and posterior/
inferior parietal cortex. One possibility is that the greater
frontal responses reflect greater engagement of motor simulation because of the dance training, and that the reduced
posterior responses reflect greater control over the visual
properties of the stimuli. (The SN and VTA were not anatomically identified in that study, so no direct comparisons
can be drawn regarding the midbrain responses.)
The results forge a critical link from the statistical violation of expected probabilities as studied in reinforcement
learning (Maia, 2009) to the subjective experience of events
in time. The activation of the MDS concurrent with prediction failures is consistent with the proposal that prediction

failures engender attentional reorienting and memory
updating. Linking attention—and particularly memory
updating—to prediction failures may be highly adaptive.
If prediction failures tend to occur at those points in time
at which a meaningful new event has begun, then that is
just the time at which one should update oneʼs mental
models of “what is happening now.” Disruption of this system may play a role in neuropsychiatric diseases in which
dopamine misregulation is implicated, including schizophrenia (Guillin, Abi-Dargham, & Laruelle, 2007) and Parkinsonʼs disease (Olanow & Tatton, 1999).
These results also forge a link from prediction failures
observed in simplified laboratory situations, such as in studies of classical conditioning (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague,
1997) and probabilistic classification (Aron et al., 2004), to
prediction failures in the comprehension of naturalistic
events. They support the hypothesis that dopamine release
in the midbrain signals prediction error not only in artificial
laboratory paradigms with a discrete “trial” structure and
repeated exposures to simplified stimuli, but also during
naturalistic events. This mechanism may be profoundly
valuable for adaptively regulating immediate behavior as well
as for guiding long-term learning about oneʼs environment.
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